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likely to do so, not that there are neutral premises to which I could appear to persuade 
them to do so. My preferred culture is as controversial as everybody else's. 
I suspect, actually, that Davidson and I do not really disagree with Kmita about 
much. We all think that communication is possible between all cultures. We all think, I 
take it, that where there is communication there is comparison. But presumably none of 
us think that comparison necessarily leads to agreement, or even to compromise. It may 
just lead to greater reciprocal dislike. 
MAREK KWIEK: On Some. Richard Rorty's Evolution 
I would like to take into consideration in this text the possibility of Richard Rorty's 
evolution of views in terms of — suggested by him — distinction between the private 
and the public as well as in terms of his dichotomous pair of „solidarity" and 
„self-creation". My efforts would aim at showing that Rorty as a commentator on other 
philosophers is more and more inclined to value the significance of self-creational, 
developing one's „final vocabulary" way of philosophizing, while on the other hand -
as a philosopher himself he has remained, as far as the private sphere goes — in his own 
philosophizing — rather moderate and full of reserve. 
Let us take as a point of our departure here the fact that in his text entitled 
„Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity" (1984) Rorty unmistakably criticizes Fouca-
ult for his writing, as he puts it, „from a point of view light-years away from the 
problems of contemporary society", for his being „a dispassionate observer" of the 
present social order and finally for the lack of „the rhetoric of emancipation" in his work 
(Rorty, 1991b, p. 173). Besides, his work shows „extraordinary dryness", „remoteness", 
or to put it in a nut-shell: communal „we" is absent from his work. This is what Rorty 
says in the times when his figure of an „ironist" was crystallized yet. It can be seen easily 
how much in the author's philosophical thinking the public sphere, the domain of 
solidarity, dominated then and it was just this domain that determined the estimation of 
the contemporary French philosophy which Rorty did not want to have much in common 
with (it can also be seen not less clearly from his polemics with Lyotard in „Cosmopoli-
tanism without Emancipation" where he accuses French philosophers of and worries 
about their „antiutopianism, their apparent loss of faith in liberal democracy") (Rorty, 
1991a, p. 220). The private, self-creation and self-invention, seems unable to find its way 
to Rorty's philosophical constellation of the middle of the eighties, though, let us add, 
formally both spheres were not isolated and opposed to each other in his discourse yet. 
The author's change in attitude towards self-creational philosophizing and generally 
to the private sphere in philosophy is brought about, just to give one example, with the 
text „Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case of Foucault" (Rorty, 1991b). It is 
here that Foucault becomes a sole object of interest but it happens this time that his 
philosophizing did have its value and significance, it would be great if it were not for one 
detail, extremely important: separation of the two spheres (called there the sphere of 
moral identity and of private autonomy) on which Foucault's stubborn thought swept, 
separation — distinct, performed by the author himself — of his two roles, indication of 
dissimilarity and separateness of the two language games. Thus Foucault would be 
entitled to self-create his personality, to develop his „final vocabulary" — and no longer 
would it be an accusation — if he were more willing to separate his moral identity (as a 
citizen) from his (private) search for autonomy. 
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In this text thus two equally justified spheres appeared, two potential references of 
the philosophical discourse, two — incompatible with each other — parts of the human 
self (which he calls „compartmentalization" of it): the private and the public (just as 
solidarity and self-creation are „equally valid, yet for ever incommensurable" as he else 
where says) (Rorty, 1989, p. 68, p. xv). Let us add here that Foucault was for Rorty of 
that time a convenient example, since his work unmistakably touched upon public 
matters, although put them in unknown previously light. So some equilibrium between 
(already separated) public and privatized philosophy, between its self-creational and 
solidarity motifs, is maintained. Let us note that the most fascinating texts devoted to 
Derrida were written towards the end of the eighties, just then (1989) there appeared also 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. It seems that Derrida must have waited — to become 
Rorty's leading example of ironist philosophizing, the one devoid of „liberal hope" and 
focused upon self-creation — until Rorty himself exposed one element out of the two 
remaining in balance. The private became this element, as it is easy to predict. 
Analyzing late Derrida's writings, especially the first part of „The Postcard", in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty unambiguously accepts the non-public kind of 
philosophy. He compares the role Derrida plays in philosophy with the one Proust did in 
the domain of literature — they both mark the new horizon, require new criteria to 
evaluate their work and to categorize them in a given genre (philosophy and literature, 
respectively). They extend the bounds of possibility. Rorty says, for example: „I take 
Derrida's importance to lie in his having had the courage to give up the attempt to unite 
the private and the public, to stop trying to bring together a quest for private autonomy 
and an attempt at public resonance and utility" (Rorty, 1989, p. 125). Derrida in Rorty's 
account does not want to participate in such a language game which does not draw a 
distinction between „phantasy and argument, philosophy and literature, serious writing 
and playful writing" — but first and foremost Derrida is not willing to write according to 
the rules of someone else's „final vocabulary". Let us pay some attention to the degree of 
overt admiration contained in Rorty's (summing-up, anyway) sentence about Derrida in 
which he says that Derrida „has written a kind of book which nobody had ever thought of 
before" (Rorty, 1989, p. 137 — emphasis mine). Finally, it is not accidental that 
Derrida's work in philosophy is compared with Marcel Proust's cathedral work, putting 
an end to the great tradition of the French prose from Montaigne on the one hand, and 
opening new horizons for the novels of the XXth century on the other. 
Rorty's creation of the figure of an „ironist" helps him to counter-balance first and 
then to overbalance one of the elements of the distinction. Although Contingency... for 
the most part is devoted to a „liberal" ironist and to a liberal utopia, it is pervaded by 
worship and admiration of a „non-liberal" ironist — of Derrida. (It might be worth-while 
to note that Rorty's attitude towards Habermas — who being „liberal", is not „ironist" -
is quite different; at least this asymmetry indicates how important irony is: you can 
forgive the lack of liberalism (with irony present), but never can it be the case with the 
lack of irony (with liberalism present). 
It seems to me — though I must admit that this feeling may be not satisfactorily 
grounded — that what pervades Contingency... is a kind of tension, perhaps connected in 
Rorty's case with his still traditional — at least with reference to himself — account of 
the role of the philosopher and of philosophy, as well as with the acceptance of a still 
classical model of an intellectual. This tension is born between an enthusiastic accep-
tance of a non-public (and obviously non-liberal), just privatized form of a philosophical 
discourse, exemplified by Derrida's writing — and still very concrete projects of „liberal 
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utopia", a constant care of those „details of pain", of „humiliation", „cruelty", present 
almost everywhere in this book. It might be thought of from a distance in the following 
way, for example: me, Richard Rorty, a neopragmatist and a liberal (the question arises 
whether „postmodern" in Lyotard's sense of the word?), for some — personal? cultural? 
institutional? or other? — reasons cannot let myself create such kind of philosophy that 
Derrida does. Me, Richard Rorty, cannot be „merely ironical", I can only be a liberal 
ironist, while what bears more significance to me out of this pair of terms is „liberalism" 
(and „solidarity", a chapter about which not accidentally closes the book). I admire 
though — let us notice the power lying in the original title of the chapter, positive, as it is 
evident from its contents: „From ironist theory to private jokes!" - I admire Derrida's 
consistency and persistence, and under the influence of the charm of philosophy of such a 
kind — I acknowledge self-creational philosophizing to be absolutely equal, if not higher 
of the two, although to me, Richard Rorty, unfortunately inaccessible... Rorty seems to 
be fascinated with the poetical side of philosophy no less than with its conceptual, 
theoretical, argumentative one. In the already mentioned article about Foucault he says 
about him that he was a philosopher who claimed a poet's privileges. „One of these 
privileges is to rejoin 'What has universal validity to do with me?' I think — he 
concludes — that philosophers are as entitled to this privilege as poets, so I think this 
rejoinder sufficient" (Rorty, 1991b, p. 198 — emphasis mine). Rorty might have not 
expected that, in a couple of years, this unnoticed and underestimated Derrida would 
become his classical example of a philosopher – poet. (Let us also remark how simple, 
assimilable, understandable Derrida is in Rorty's account, how good clues he provides to 
his riddles...) 
It should not be forgotten though that it was already in the second half of the 
seventies that Rorty touched upon the significance of Derrida's philosophizing, not using 
then, obviously, the distinctions drawn later on — the private/the public and self-cre-
ation/solidarity (not to mention his later famous essay entitled „Philosophy as a Kind of 
Writing" in which philosophy is seen as a family romance, with Father Parmenides, 
Uncle Kant and bad Brother Derrida) (Rorty, 1982, p. 92). He thought of Derrida then as 
„a writer who is helping to see philosophy as a kind of writing rather than a domain of 
quasi-scientific inquiry" (Rorty, 1977, p. 673). There appeared in this article rather the 
opposition of philosophy and literature, of a writer on the one, and a philosopher on the 
other hand, or — quite shyly still — of „normal" and „abnormal" philosophy (the last 
qualification being devoid of any feeling of condemnation, disapproval or of any 
pejorative colouring). „Abnormal inquiry — called 'revolutionary' when it works and 
'kooky' when it does not — requires only genius", the author says. It seems to have 
taken Rorty almost a decade to recontekstualize the term „philosophy" in such a way that 
Derrida's work is entitled to be included there without without further hesitation. It was 
already in this text written in 1977 that Rorty — although distancing himself from the 
„Continental" philosophy by locating himself within the „serious" tradition of the Anglo-
American philosophical thinking — saw the meaning and purpose in dealing with 
philosophers and not only philosophical claims, the sense of overcoming and surpassing 
one's predecessors, and not only solving inherited problems. This philosophical split into 
two traditions took place in Rorty's view after Kant, together with Hegel's Phenomenol-
ogy and it is present today, giving rise to two parallel „philosophies", linked only by the 
traditional, common name (Rorty, 1991b, p. 21). 
To sum up: what reveals itself in the case of Rorty is an interesting evolution in his 
approach to philosophy, its role and position in the world, as well as to a philosopher and 
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his or her tasks. Apart from a publicly „committed" figure, a private philosopher (Rorty 
says: „I claim that ironist philosophers are private philosophers") whose work is „use-
less" to liberals „qua liberals", is born. Towards the end of the period of a metanarrative, 
also its „producer" (Lyotard) — philosopher in the traditional sense of the word -
comes into oblivion, into inexistence. This evolution in the case of Richard Rorty could 
be shown in the form of the following catchwords, although explicite they appeared only 
in its last stage which required radical, dichotomous split, namely: the public — the 
public and the private —the private. Rorty's course seems today to be from quite typical 
gradual leaving the „public" discourse (within which his object of criticism was 
Foucault, although when Derrida already glimmered somewhere as an interesting theme 
from the border line of philosophy and literature), through the acceptance of both types 
of philosophizing and equal justification of both spheres: the private and the public (just 
like in „The Case of Foucault"), to overtly expressed in Contingency... fascination with 
"private" and „self-creational" philosophizing of the late Derrida. 
With one reservation though: Rorty himself seems not to stick to an „ironist's" rules: 
it is not clear whether his sole aim is his own final vocabulary; his ideal is obviously not 
a „strong poet", he does not create his radically own, idiosyncratic language game, he 
moves within the domain of inherited questions and problems (though he writes about 
some of them that it might be better to „dissolve" them then „solve"); he argues with his 
opponents on the common ground instead of avoiding head-on fights and various tricks, 
and finally — there is much more of a „liberal" in him than of an „ironist", more of an 
advocate of solidarity than of self-creation... It seems an extremely interesting question 
what next Richard Rorty's step will be like: but not Rorty's as a person writing about 
philosophers (since this we know: long live Derrida!), but as a person who himself is a 
philosopher, who must himself struggle with incommensurability of private and public 
universes. Is it so that „philosophy has become more important for the pursuit of private 
perfection rather than for any social task"? (Rorty, 1989, p. 94) And if it actually is the 
case, to which degree this statement would apply to its author? Will he also step into, or 
is just stepping — as it might be expected from the evolution shyly sketched here — into 
the private world of philosophical imagination, the world of phantastic — since merely 
(?) self-creational — projects? That is the question. 
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RICHARD RORTY: Response to Marek Kwiek 
Marek Kwiek writes very perceptively about the changes in my attitudes toward 
various figures over the years, and raises some very good questions. I am flattered by his 
close attention to my writings, but I think that there is one point at which he gets me 
wrong. I do not think it is the case (now or in the past) that I „can forgive the lack of 
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